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Abstract 
 
The Heideggerian account of the ontotheological constitution of Western 
metaphysics has been extremely influential for contemporary philosophy of 
religion and for philosophical perspectives on theology and the divine. This 
paper introduces and contrasts two central strategies for approaching the 
question of the divine in a non- or post-ontotheological manner. The first and 
more established approach is that of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics and 
deconstruction, inspired by Heidegger’s suggestion of a “theology without the 
word ‘being’” and by his later notions of an “ultimate god” and of “divinities” 
as one of the four axes of the fourfold (Geviert). Here, the divine is no longer 
articulated in terms of the supreme or absolute being, but as one of the 
interdependent dimensions of finite and contextual meaningful presence. The 
more recent approach introduced by Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux 
dissociates itself from the Heideggerian hermeneutics of finitude and adopts 
mathematics as its basic ontological model. Rather than focusing on meaning 
and sense, Badiou and Meillassoux replace ontotheological metaphysics with 
materialist frameworks. With regard to the divine, this approach leads either 
to a contemporary version of atheism (Badiou) or to the reintroduction of a 
divine entity, but now a merely possible and contingent one (Meillassoux). 
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1. Hermeneutical and materialist post-ontotheologies 
 
The concept of ontotheology and the analysis of the 
ontotheological constitution of the Western metaphysical 
tradition—of the inherent tendency of metaphysics to posit an 
absolute point of reference for all beings, identified by Aristotle 
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and Aristotelian Scholasticism with the metaphysical divinity—
have been among the most prominent aspects of Martin 
Heidegger’s philosophical legacy. The hermeneutical and 
deconstructive “weak” perspectives on theology, religion, and 
the divine introduced by thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, 
Gianni Vattimo, Jean-Luc Marion, John Caputo, Richard 
Kearney, and Merold Westphal have been particularly inspired 
by Heidegger’s allusion, in a 1951 seminar in Zürich, to the idea 
of a theology without the word “being”1—hence the title of 
Marion’s God without Being (Dieu sans l’être, 1988)—and by the 
enigmatic and underdeveloped description, in Contributions to 
Philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie, 1936–38), of an “ultimate 
god” (der letzte Gott) that is sharply differentiated from the 
ontotheological God of Aristotelian metaphysics and Christian 
Scholasticism. In France, the prominence of the post-
Heideggerian philosophical interest in religion was addressed 
by Dominique Janicaud (1991; Janicaud et al. 2000) as a 
“theological turn” in French phenomenology. 
However, in recent years, we have witnessed the 
emergence of a very different approach to ontotheology—one 
that, to a certain extent, accepts Heidegger’s diagnosis of a 
strong ontotheological tendency inherent in Western 
metaphysics, yet rejects many of the philosophical 
consequences that Heidegger draws from this diagnosis. This is 
the avenue introduced by Alain Badiou and further developed 
by his pupil, Quentin Meillassoux. For Badiou and Meillassoux, 
the closure of ontotheology by no means implies a radical 
rupture or transformation of the classical philosophical project 
as such. Non-ontotheological thinking, they argue, does not 
necessarily entail a fundamental overhaul of the Western 
philosophical tradition as a whole or a hermeneutic 
embracement of a “weak” thinking devoid of absoluteness and 
universality. They are specifically opposed to the Heideggerian 
finitization of thinking, the roots of which they trace back to 
Kant’s critical philosophy. Meillassoux, in particular, has 
argued that Kant’s “Copernican revolution,” with its shift of 
philosophical focus to the correlation between thinking and 
being that is subsequently thematized by Heidegger as a 
factical, context-sensitive, and historically situated process, has 
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led to the progressive deabsolutization of thinking that 
Meillassoux precisely seeks to overcome by showing that it 
ultimately rests on an implicit absolute thesis, namely, that of 
absolute contingency. For both Badiou and Meillassoux, the tool 
required to overcome the contemporary philosophy of finitude is 
mathematics, the ontological appropriation of which—and that 
of post-Cantorian set theory in particular—allows non-
ontotheological ontological frameworks ultimately committed to 
forms of materialism. 
 In what follows, I will briefly compare the Heideggerian 
hermeneutical notion of post-ontotheological thinking to the 
Badiouan and Meillassouxian materialist versions. Such a 
preliminary comparison will enable us to see how replacing the 
meaning- and language-centered orientation of Heidegger’s 
“poetic” or “correlationist” postmetaphysics (and, in a sense, of 
post-Kantian philosophy as a whole) with an approach based on 
the absolute ontological significance of mathematics and set 
theory can also lead to a new kind of rationalism regarding 
philosophy’s relation to divinity and the divine. 
 
2. Divinity without “being”: Heidegger and the ultimate 
god 
 
Despite its strong association with the Heideggerian 
deconstruction of Western metaphysics, the term “ontotheology” 
was not coined by Heidegger but—significantly from the point 
of view of Meillassoux’s reading of Heidegger as a kind of 
“ultimate Kantian”—by Kant. In the transcendental dialectic of 
his first Critique, Kant (1998a, 699–700 [A 631–32; B 659–60]; 
1998b, 584) distinguishes two main forms of rational theology: 
transcendental theology (a “deistic” approach to the deity based 
on the concepts of pure reason) and natural theology (a 
“theistic” approach based on concepts from empirical nature). 
Transcendental theology is further divided into ontotheology 
(based on purely conceptual arguments, e.g., that the concept of 
the supreme being necessarily entails its existence) and 
cosmotheology (based on the transcendental implications of a 
certain type of experience, e.g., that of one’s own existence); the 
main types of natural theology are physicotheology (based on 
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the observed causal order of natural things) and moral theology 
(based on the moral order observed in the world). Construed as 
attempts to prove the objective reality of God as the supreme 
being, Kant argues, even cosmotheology and physicotheology 
are ultimately ontotheological modes of deducing the necessary 
existence of a supreme being from the necessity of the concept of 
a supreme being. This, however, is for Kant a speculative move 
that illegitimately supposes being (existence) to be a “real 
predicate,” an attribute that adds something to a concept and 
without which it would be less perfect. Transcendental theology 
can therefore only have a negative function immanent to 
reason: it shows that the structure of theoretical rationality 
inherently requires a transcendental ideal of perfection for 
which an objective counterpart can never be found in 
experience and the existence of which can therefore never be 
proven or disproven (Kant 1998a, 706–07 [A 640–41; B 668–69]; 
1998b, 588). In his Critique of Practical Reason Kant (1996, 
239–46; 2003, 167–77 [A 223–37; AA 124–32]) goes on to show 
that a form of moral theology, which shows the necessity of a 
supreme good as a practical postulate of moral agency and as 
an object of “moral faith,” remains viable and practically 
necessary, but this is precisely a non-ontotheological approach 
that does not constitute a theoretical “proof” of God’s objective 
reality. 
In the Kantian critique of ontotheology, and in the 
subsequent notion of the divinity as a regulative rational ideal 
to which it is illegitimate to attribute being in the sense of 
objective existence, it is possible to see a prototype of the 
Heideggerian “theology without ‘being’.” However, the 
Heideggerian use of the term “ontotheology” is much wider and 
has a broader historical perspective.2 While Kant associates 
ontotheology with the use of ontological arguments for 
theological ends, historically associated with Scholasticism and 
Descartes, Heidegger employs the term to designate the use of 
theology for ontological purposes, a tendency paradigmatically 
exhibited by the basic structure of the Aristotelian Metaphysics. 
The “first philosophy” that constitutes the subject matter 
of the Metaphysics is famously characterized by Aristotle as a 
science of being qua being (to on hē on; Metaphysics 
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Γ.1.1003a21–32), i.e., as a general ontology of everything that 
in some sense is. The obvious problem of ontology as a science is 
its extreme generality. “Being as such” cannot function as the 
most general kind or genus of all things (Β.3.998b22–27; 
Η.6.1045b6; Posterior Analytics II.7.92b13–14); Aristotle’s 
theory of definition precludes the possibility of one supreme 
genus that would comprise everything, since its subspecies 
could not be differentiated using meaningful criteria 
independent of the genus and the subspecies (Metaphysics 
Ζ.12.1037b29–1038a35; Topics VI.6.144a28–b11). The supreme 
genera are thus the different categories and modalities of being, 
and being as such (to on) is a “transcendental” determination in 
the Scholastic sense of transcending the limits of even the 
supreme genera or kinds of beings and is itself without a 
general definition. Being is articulated in several different 
senses (to on legetai pollachōs) that are not reducible to any 
single basic meaning (Γ.2.1003a33). Even so, “being” is not a 
purely equivocal term; its many different senses are still 
related to a unity and to some single nature (pros hen kai mian 
tina physin; 1003a33–34), to a single principle (pros mian 
archēn; 1003b6). Like “being,” the term “healthy” (hygieinon) is 
used in several irreducibly different senses, but these are all 
related, albeit in different ways, to health as an ideal state of a 
living body: a healthy complexion is a sign of health, healthy 
habits are means for attaining and preserving health, and so on 
(1003a34–b4). In the case of being, the corresponding ideal or 
standard sense is ousia, “substance” or, more broadly, 
“beingness”—the mode of being of a separate, determinate, and 
ontologically independent particular thing (1003b6–19; 
Ζ.1.1028a10–b4). Ousia is the point of reference for the 
different senses and hierarchies of being: it is substantial being 
as opposed to predicable being, actuality as opposed to potency, 
and so on. 
However, concrete material substances involve a 
problematic ontological duality, exposed in Metaphysics Ζ, Η, 
and Θ. On the one hand, their beingness—that which makes 
them the determinate things they are—consists in their 
species-form (eidos), i.e., that which makes them what they are, 
instantiations of a specific type of thing (Ζ.3.1029a7–30; 
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17.1041b5–9). On the other hand, form alone does not 
constitute a concrete spatiotemporal thing, a “this”; for this 
purpose, an additional individuating matter (hylē) is required 
(Η.1.1042a24–31). Because of the matter-form twofoldness, the 
beingness (ousia) of concrete material things cannot be the 
ultimate unifying reference point of all beings. This can only be 
an ideal entity, an ideal instance of ousia—perfectly simple and 
indivisible, perfectly actual and perfectly identical with its own 
essence (Λ.1.1069a18–b2; 6.1071b2–7). This is the God (theos) of 
metaphysics, the absolutely self-sufficient “thought thinking 
itself” (noēsis noēseōs)—the ultimate “final cause” of all things, 
the unmoved mover whose ontological perfection all material, 
transient, and contingent things strive to emulate (7.1072a19–
b30; 8.1074a33–37; 9.1074b17–1075a5). When the particular 
structure of its subject matter is properly understood, ontology, 
the science of being as such, can only be realized in the form of 
theology, of the science of the supreme mode of being. “General 
metaphysics” is implemented through a “special metaphysics,” 
but one that studies precisely the ultimate point of reference 
and ideal for all beings, i.e., the perfection of beingness 
(Ε.1.1026a23–32). 
This Aristotelian conflation of ontology and theology—the 
move of thinking that proves the ontological necessity of a 
supreme being and by so doing brings ontology to its 
culmination—is precisely what Heidegger understands by 
ontotheology. He repeatedly returns to the ontological-
theological twofoldness of Aristotle’s determination of first 
philosophy in his early lecture courses3, and summarizes it in 
his 1949 introduction to What Is Metaphysics? in the following 
way:  
[…] metaphysics represents the beingness [Seiendheit] of beings in a 
twofold manner: in the first place, the totality of beings as such with an 
eye to their most universal traits (on katholou, koinon); but at the same 
time also the totality of beings as such in the sense of the highest and 
therefore divine being (on katholou, akrotaton, theion). In the 
metaphysics of Aristotle, the unconcealedness of beings as such is 
specifically developed in this twofold manner […]. According to its 
essence, metaphysics is at the same time both ontology in the narrower 
sense, and theology. (Heidegger 1996, 378–79; 1998d, 287) 
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The term “ontotheology” is adopted in Heidegger’s 1930–
31 course on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit to designate the 
tendency of Hegel’s speculative idealism, inherited from ancient 
metaphysics, to orient the question of being to the divine, which 
Hegel grasps in terms of his speculative logic (Heidegger 1988b, 
140–43; 1994b, 97–99). The term is then used repeatedly in 
connection with Plato (Heidegger 1996, 235–36; 1998d, 180–81), 
Kant (Heidegger 1996, 449; 1998d, 340), Hegel (Heidegger 
1989, 206; 1999, 144; 2002c, 152; 2003b, 202–03; 2009, 81; 2012, 
161), Schelling (Heidegger 1985, 51, 66; 1995b, 62, 79), and 
Nietzsche (Heidegger 1991d, 210; 1998c, 314). Heidegger’s 
perhaps most lucid formulation of the ontotheological mode of 
thought can be found in his 1944–46 essay on “Nihilism as 
Determined by the History of Being”: 
Of course, metaphysics acknowledges that beings [Seiendes] are not 
without being [Sein]. But scarcely has it said so when it again relocates 
being [Sein] in a being [Seiendes] […]. The grounding of being—which 
has barely been given a thought—in the most-being [Seiendsten] of 
beings proceeds, in accordance with the metaphysical question, from 
beings as such. […] Because metaphysics, in thinking beings as such, is 
approached by being but thinks it on the basis of and with reference to 
beings, metaphysics as such must therefore speak out (legein) the 
theion in the sense of the supremely being ground. Metaphysics is 
inherently theology. It is theology to the extent that it speaks out 
beings qua beings, on hē on. Ontology is simultaneously and 
necessarily theology. (1991d, 208–09; 1998c, 311, 312, 313; tr. mod.) 
Ontotheology, for Heidegger, is the approach in which the basic 
ontological question concerning being (Sein) as such—apart 
from all of its particular instances, all individual things that 
are, beings—encounters the universality and indeterminacy of 
“being as such” and theologically resorts to the supreme and 
ideal instance of being, the most-being of beings, as the absolute 
point of reference of all beings. While ontotheological 
metaphysics starts from the very acknowledgement of the fact 
that being as such is not identical with any particular thing 
that is, it ultimately fails to think this difference between being 
and that-which-is in positive terms (2002c, 274–75; 2003b, 364–
65). Precisely because of the fact that being as such is not 
determinable in the way specific beings are, ontotheology ends 
up determining being as such in terms of the supreme being. In 
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his most profound and demanding discussion of ontotheology, 
The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics (1957), 
Heidegger puts this in another way: since metaphysics 
essentially looks at being as the ground (Grund) of all that is, 
and thinks of ground in terms of a “cause” (Ursache) that is 
itself something determinate, it ends up pointing to God, the 
supreme being, as the primal (and ultimate) final cause of all 
things that is also its own cause. 
[…] the matter [Sache] of thinking is beings [das Seiende] as such, that 
is, being [Sein]. Being shows itself in the essential mode of a ground 
[Grundes]. Accordingly, the matter of thinking, being as the ground, is 
thought out fully only when the ground is represented as the first 
ground, prōtē archē. The original matter of thinking presents itself as 
the primal cause [Ur-sache], the causa prima that corresponds to the 
establishing [begründenden] recourse to the ultima ratio, the final 
account [Rechenschaft]. The being of beings is represented 
fundamentally, in the sense of the ground, only as causa sui. This is 
the metaphysical concept of God. Metaphysics must think in the 
direction of the deity because the matter of thinking is being—namely, 
being as ground, in diverse ways […]. (2002a, 51; 2002b, 59–60; tr. 
mod.) 
In Heidegger’s historical narrative, ontotheological 
thinking originates with Plato, more specifically in Book VI of 
the Republic (508d4–509c2), where the Idea of the Good is 
singled out as the Idea of Ideas, as the Idea of ideality as such 
that makes possible all the other Ideas as the ideal conceptual 
identities of particular things (Heidegger 1996, 235–36; 1998d, 
180–81). Since its Platonic-Aristotelian inauguration, 
Heidegger (2002a, 45; 2002b, 54) maintains, the basic 
framework of the entire ancient, medieval, and modern 
metaphysical tradition up to Hegel and Nietzsche remains 
ontotheological. That Heidegger views Nietzsche, the minister 
of the “death of God,” as a culmination of ontotheological 
thinking highlights the fact that his notion of ontotheology is 
not limited to the metaphysical models in which the 
metaphysical or Christian God holds an absolute position. 
Rather, ontotheology stands for the absolutizing tendency of 
Western philosophy as such, for the quest for an absolute point 
of reference for all things. Starting from Descartes, the 
Aristotelian-Neoplatonic-Scholastic deity gradually surrenders 
its metaphysical role to subjectivity, in the sense of the 
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indubitably certain self-consciousness of the thinking ego.4 
Even Kant remains ontotheological in the Heideggerian sense: 
for Kant’s transcendental idealism, the “unity of transcendental 
apperception,” i.e., the potential association of the 
representation “I think” with all other representations (Kant 
1998a, 178–81, 215–16 [A 106–108; B 131–136]; 1998b, 246–
48), holds the role of a universal (albeit immanent and non-
absolute) point of reference.5 The ontotheological hierarchy 
implicit in Kant’s critical philosophy is absolutized in 
speculative idealism, particularly at the end of Hegel’s Science 
of Logic, where the Absolute Idea—the absolutely 
comprehensive determination—is identified with being (Sein) in 
its dialectically fully unfolded sense (Hegel 1981, 236; 2010, 
735; Heidegger 1997b, 383–384; 2006b, 339–40; 2008b, 46). 
Being as such and the supreme instance of being are thus 
conflated, and this is the first stage in the conclusion of 
ontotheology, one that leaves no more conceptual leeway for the 
development of metaphysics in its rational-speculative form. In 
Heidegger’s reading, however, it is Nietzsche who makes the 
last move of modern ontotheology by replacing the theoretical 
and speculative notion of subjectivity with a willing 
subjectivity—with a notion of subjectivity as the will to power 
that ultimately wills nothing exterior to itself.6  
This narrative provides the cue for the key topic of 
Heidegger’s later thinking, the “other beginning” (der andere 
Anfang) of Western thought delineated in Contributions to 
Philosophy and related texts.7 Very generally speaking, the 
other beginning would transform the first (Greek) beginning(s) 
of philosophy and metaphysics into a post-Nietzschean and 
post-metaphysical approach that would renounce the quest for 
absoluteness altogether and hermeneutically embrace the 
radical finitude, historicity, and context-specificity of thinking. 
We cannot here go into the details of this fundamental 
transformation of which Heidegger produced only more or less 
preparatory and fragmentary drafts. However, what interests 
us with regard to our topic and from the point of view of the 
reappropriation of the Heideggerian critique of ontotheology in 
contemporary theology, are the transformations in the notions 
of the deity and divinity that the end of ontotheology would 
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entail. Of this, Heidegger gives us some clues. At the end of The 
Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics, he famously 
notes that “the god-less thinking which must abandon the god 
of philosophy, god as causa sui, is […] perhaps closer to the 
divine [göttlichen] god.” (Heidegger 2002a, 64–65; 2002b, 72; tr. 
mod.) 
Even though Heidegger’s brief draft on the “ultimate god” 
in the Contributions remains for the most part shrouded in the 
enigmatic postmetaphysical shorthand of the work and replete 
with nuances and aspects that we cannot begin to unravel here, 
its main outline is quite clear.8 The ultimate god is “completely 
other to the previous ones, particularly to the Christian one” 
(Heidegger 1989, 403; 1999, 283; 2012, 319) and in this sense 
can be identified with the “divine god” to which the post-
ontotheological “god-less thinking” remains open. Whereas the 
Christian God became interpreted in Aristotelian-Scholastic 
terms as the most-being of all beings and thus as the 
foundation of the hierarchical metaphysical “system of being,” 
the god of the Heideggerian “other beginning” 
is neither a “being” [seiend] nor an “non-being” [unseiend], and also not 
to be equated with beyng [Seyn, i.e., postmetaphysically reconsidered 
being]. Rather, beyng abides [west] temporally and spatially as that 
“between” [Zwischen] that can never be grounded in god but also not in 
the human being as something occurring [vorhandenes] and living, but 
only in Da-sein. (Heidegger 1989, 263; 1999, 185–86; 2012, 207; tr. 
mod.)9 
While ancient and medieval metaphysics situated the 
Archimedean point of “beings as a whole” in God’s perfection 
and modern metaphysics relocated it in the immanence of the 
thinking (human) subjectivity, Heideggerian postmetaphysics 
makes both of these former points of reference interdependent 
dimensions or poles in a multidimensional and multipolar event 
of the spatiotemporal contextualization of meaningful presence, 
i.e., in the event or “taking-place” (Ereignis) of beyng (Seyn). 
Just like the Heideggerian “subject,” the human being who is no 
longer simply identical with Da-sein, i.e., with the dynamic 
context or place into which beyng “takes place,” but simply one 
of its essential contributors or participants, the Heideggerian 
deity has become radically deabsolutized: far from being the 
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paradigm of self-sufficient and substantial being, the divine is 
merely one of the interdependent aspects of contextualized 
meaningfulness. It has no subsistence outside the process of 
contextualization but is radically dependent upon it. What is at 
stake in the postmetaphysical transformation is the 
“recognition of the belonging of the human being to beyng 
[Seyn] through god, the admission [Eingeständnis] by god that 
it needs beyng, an admission that does not relinquish god or its 
greatness.” (Heidegger 1989, 413; 1999, 291; 2012, 327; tr. 
mod.) For Heidegger, an important aspect of the greatness of 
the postmetaphysical poet Hölderlin lies in the latter’s 
invention, in Verse VIII of his hymn The Rhine, of a 
deabsolutized divinity, of a meaning-bestowing dimension that 
is itself dependent on being acknowledged and received by the 
human being.10  
Arguably the most developed account of the Heideggerian 
postmetaphysical divinity, and one that is deeply informed by 
Hölderlin’s language, is the late account of the fourfold 
(Geviert), in which the “divinities” (die Göttlichen) figure as one 
of the four meaning-dimensions that converge in the singular 
and situated meaningfulness of a particular thing. None of 
these dimensions, including the divine one, is independent of 
their reciprocal intertwining in the thing as a focal point of 
experienced meaning (Heidegger 2000b, 172; 2001a, 177). The 
divinities, in the plural, are the “beckoning [winkenden] envoys 
of the deity [Gottheit]. From the concealed prevailing [Walten] 
of these [divinities], god appears in its essence [Wesen], which 
withdraws it beyond any comparison with what is present [dem 
Anwesenden].” (2000b, 171; 2001a, 176; tr. mod.) The deity is 
the dimension of ultimate purpose—it is not a present and self-
subsistent entity but rather a dimension of radical futurity that 
appears and is encountered through its different aspects, the 
divine “indications” or “hints” (Winke) of an ultimate meaning. 
This god “has” no being but is a dimension of the meaningful 
taking-place (Ereignis) of being as a divinity always yet to come, 
not as an eschatological future present expected or anticipated 
by humans, but as the futural dimension of purpose towards 
which the “futural ones of the ultimate god” (die Zukünftigen 
des letzten Gottes; 1989, 399; 1999, 280; 2012, 316), i.e., the 
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postontotheological “theologians,” are primarily oriented and 
which in this sense “awaits” human beings (1989, 417; 1999, 
293; 2012, 330). 
 
3. Against poetic theology and fideism: Badiou’s 
contemporary atheism and Meillassoux’s virtual god 
 
In his Briefings on Existence (Court traité d’ontologie 
transitoire, 1998), Alain Badiou presents a succinct but highly 
interesting discussion of what he calls Heidegger’s “aporia,” 
referring to the latter’s (Heidegger 2000a, 671; 1993b, 107) 
famous words in his 1966 interview for Der Spiegel: “How can it 
be that the thinker who determined metaphysics as onto-
theology, an overshadowing of the question of being [être] by 
that of the supreme being [étant], ends up saying in his 
testament that only a god can save us?” (Badiou 1998, 18; 
2006a, 27–28; tr. mod.) Badiou is well aware that Heidegger 
has in mind a type of god that is identical neither with the God 
of metaphysics nor with the God of the monotheistic religions, 
but rather corresponds to the Hölderlinian divinity, “the God of 
poets,” an ultimate source of meaningfulness, “that from which 
[…] there is the enchantment of the world.” (Badiou 1998, 18–
19; 2006a, 28) The passive prospect of a “divine intervention” 
involves a poetic, nostalgic, and melancholic vision of a “re-
enchantment” of the world through the emergence of a new 
dimension of ultimate purposiveness. Thus, the (Heideggerian) 
“deconstruction of metaphysics and assent given to the death of 
the Christian God has held the chances open for the God of the 
poem.” (1998, 19; 2006a, 29)  
“To say “only a god can save us” means: the thinking informed by the 
poets […] may uphold […] the possibility, devoid of any way or means 
open to utterance, of a resacralization of the earth.” (1989, 32; 1999, 51; 
tr. mod.) 
For Badiou, such a poetic longing for the arrival of 
divinity—as well as what he regards as Heidegger’s “poetic 
ontology” as a whole—cannot avoid having reactionary 
intellectual and political implications, as is evident, he thinks, 
from Heidegger’s attempt at overcoming contemporary 
“technical nihilism” and from his infamous political error. 
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(1989, 7–12, 33–40; 1999, 27–32, 53–60) In Badiou’s eyes, 
contemporary “antiphilosophy,” with its resigned pessimism 
regarding the prospects of the classical philosophical project 
and of the progressive enterprises of modernity in general, is 
directly informed by the Heideggerian “suturing” of philosophy 
to poetry and by the associated dream of a “salvation” in the 
form of a re-enchantment by meaning of the homogenized and 
inherently meaningless contemporary technical reality. (1989, 
7–12, 21–26, 49–58; 1999, 27–32, 41–45, 69–77) Overcoming the 
late modern predicament therefore entails, Badiou maintains, 
the adoption of a “contemporary atheism,” one that surrenders 
not only the ontotheological divinity but the poetic one as well. 
(1998, 20; 2006, 29) A key point in this approach is the attack 
on the central topic of Heidegger’s thinking: finitude, which 
Badiou sees as a part of contemporary philosophy’s Kantian 
legacy.11 
That our exposure to being is essentially finite and that we must 
forever return to our mortal-being, is the fact from which we endure 
the living God’s death only to uphold, under multiple shapes, the 
indistinct promise of a sense that has withdrawn, but whose “come-
back” has not been debarred. […] It is thus imperative, so as to be 
serenely established in the irreversible element of God’s death, to 
finish up with the motif of finitude. […] the aim is to finish up with the 
motif of finitude and its hermeneutical escort. (Badiou 1998, 20, 21; 
2006a, 29, 30; tr. mod.) 
The method for achieving this break with the 
Heideggerian hermeneutics of finitude is famously discovered 
by Badiou in mathematics—more specifically, in post-Cantorian 
set theory, with its revolutionary new way of mathematizing 
the infinite in the form of different infinite multiplicities with 
different cardinalities. The key ontological import of set theory 
is, for Badiou, its ability to dissociate the notion of infinity from 
the metaphysical notion of an ultimate and supreme unity of 
being, of an ultimate and absolute point of reference that would 
unify all finite and determinate things—in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, the metaphysical God. From the recognition that 
all beings cannot be brought under one univocal concept or 
“set”—i.e., that there can be no “universal set,” that the totality 
of beings is an inconsistent multiplicity in Cantor’s sense 
(Badiou 1988, 53; 2005, 41)—Aristotle deduced that ontology 
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must take recourse in the supreme being as the absolutely 
universal reference point, “infinite” in the sense that it is 
beyond any material and spatiotemporal specificity.12 This is 
precisely how Badiou defines ontotheology in his magnum opus, 
Being and Event, the main exposition of his equation of 
ontology with mathematics: ontotheology is the metaphysical 
approach “for which the absolute is thought as a supreme 
infinite being, thus as transmathematical, in-numerable, as a 
form of the one so radical that no multiple can consist therein.” 
(1988, 53; 2005, 42; cf. 1988, 161–62; 2005, 142–43) Against 
ontotheology, Badiou posits his mathematical, set-theoretical 
ontology, which accepts only consistent multiplicities—ones 
that can be treated as sets—and for which an inconsistent 
multiplicity simply is not, is non-being. In other words, for 
mathematical ontology, the one, in the sense of an ultimate and 
absolute unity, is not. (1988, 53–54; 2005, 42)  
This is the foundational “decision” of Badiou’s ontology, 
which he considers to be a break with the history of 
ontotheological metaphysics: there is no unity or totality of 
being, no Archimedean point for everything. Rather, being as 
such is pure, inconsistent multiplicity that resists all 
unification (1988, 33, 550, 555; 2005, 25, 511, 519). Unity 
pertains only to particular instances or “presentations” of 
being—“situations” or “worlds”—which are consistent 
multiplicities based on a unifying, structuring operation of 
“count-as-one” that determines what, in each particular 
situation, is to be counted as a being. (1988, 31–39, 104–05, 
539, 557; 2005, 23–30, 90, 504, 522) Being as such, that which 
is fundamentally presented in all structured situations of being, 
is beyond consistent multiplicities and the unities they are 
composed of; it “is” a multiplicity only in retrospect, in the sense 
of “not-one,” of being beyond the structured sets that ontology 
operates with. For Badiou, such an ontology also constitutes a 
break with Heideggerian post-ontotheological hermeneutics, 
which still looks if not to an ultimate unity, at least to an 
ultimate dimension of sense and purpose inherent in being as 
the taking-place of finite and situated meaningfulness. 
Heidegger’s “poetic” ontology is still preoccupied with what has 
always been the focal topic of metaphysics: being as meaningful 
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presence or intelligibility, which accordingly sees ontology as a 
study of meaning (1988, 16; 2005 9–10). In its Badiouan sense 
as the inconsistent multiplicity that precedes all structured 
consistency, being is the inherently meaningless, homogenous, 
undifferentiated, and inarticulate “raw material” of situations 
or worlds. As Badiou points out in a 1997 interview with Peter 
Hallward, this can be rendered as a fundamentally materialist 
approach: “‘Matter’ would simply be, immediately after being, 
the most general possible name of the presented (of ‘what is 
presented’). […] I am a materialist in the sense that I think 
that any presentation is material.” (Badiou 2001, 130) Such a 
mathematical, materialist ontology invites us to  
restitute the infinite to the banality of manifold-being […]. […] the 
destiny of every situation is the infinite manifold of sets. Depth cannot 
ever develop there, and the homogeneity of the manifold ontologically 
prevails over the play of intensities. […] the search for sense is reduced 
for us to the sole numbering of this infinity […]. (Badiou 1998, 21–22; 
2006, 30) 
One of the central accomplishments of this model is, for 
Badiou, that it makes any notion of divinity superfluous. It 
confirms the “death,” proclaimed by Nietzsche, of the Christian 
God; by abandoning the notion of ultimate unity, it dispenses 
with the need for the ontotheological God of metaphysics; and 
thirdly, it also makes the Heideggerian post-ontotheological 
divinity, the “God of poetry” unnecessary by adopting a basic 
“nihilism” in the sense of an understanding of being as such as 
inherently meaningless. What Badiou shares with his great 
contemporary Deleuze is a commitment to a fundamental 
immanence, divested of all references to transcendence, either 
ontotheologically or hermeneutically conceived.13 “Committed to 
the triple destitution of the gods, we […] can assert that 
everything is here, always here, and that thought’s reserve lies 
in the thoroughly informed and firmly declared egalitarian 
platitude of what befalls upon us here.” (Badiou 1998, 23; 2006, 
31) The sole dimension of purpose lies within the subjective 
truth-processes—politics, art, science, and love—that 
indefinitely reconfigure the world of immanence in terms of a 
potentially transformative historical event; thus, for Badiou 
(1997; 2003), even the apostle Paul becomes a pre-eminently 
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political figure, faithfully committed to the revolutionizing 
event of Christ’s death.14  
In his breakthrough work After Finitude: An Essay on the 
Necessity of Contingency (Après la finitude: essai sur la nécessité 
de la contingence, 2006), Quentin Meillassoux adopts the 
essential core of the Badiouan understanding of ontotheology 
and of the problematic consequences of the Heideggerian 
attempt at overcoming it. As is announced by its title, the book 
is essentially aimed at uncovering the inner inconsistencies and 
philosophical limitations of the Kantian topic of the inherent 
finitude of thinking and its hermeneutical developments and 
variations. Meillassoux's argumentation is informed by his 
brilliant analysis of what he sees as the dominant framework of 
Western philosophy as a whole since Kant: correlationism, the 
approach that sets out from the philosophical irreducibility of 
the correlation between being and thinking (in the widest 
possible sense that comprises knowledge, experience, 
consciousness, discourse, language, and willing) and maintains 
that being and thinking are inconceivable apart from one 
another (Meillassoux 2006a, 18–23; 2008a, 5–9). In addition to 
Kantian transcendental idealism (“weak correlationism”), 
which retains the necessity of an absolute (but unknowable) 
level of “things in themselves” beyond the domain of the 
transcendental structures of the correlation—and was later 
converted by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel into an absolute 
idealism that denies the intelligibility of things in themselves 
and absolutizes the correlation itself—the correlationist 
framework also comprises the Heideggerian hermeneutics of 
finitude (“strong correlationism”), which denies the 
intelligibility of things in themselves but also promotes the 
radical facticity (i.e., non-absoluteness, matter-of-factness, lack 
of absolute justification) of the correlation, thus denying 
thinking access to any kind of absolute. (Meillassoux 2006a, 42–
60; 2008a, 30–43)  
Through a highly original and intricate chain of 
argumentation Meillassoux (2006a, 69–109; 2008a, 50–81) 
concludes, however, that in order to truly distinguish itself from 
absolute idealism and to avoid internal contradiction, strong 
correlationism must ultimately absolutize its principle of 
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facticity—i.e., maintain that an absolute entity or level of being 
is not only inconceivable and unthinkable but in fact absolutely 
impossible, thus turning the principle of facticity into an 
absolute principle of contingency. All experienced things, all the 
structures of experiences, as well as experience as such, i.e., the 
prevailing of the correlation itself, are not only given to 
thinking as mere facts without any visible absolute logical 
necessity, but indeed absolutely unfounded, unnecessary, and 
contingent facts. But if this is the case, the strong correlationist 
deabsolutization of thinking has ultimately failed: it is 
compelled to retain a “minimal absoluteness,” i.e., the absolute 
validity of the non-absoluteness of all things as such. It is 
necessary that nothing—no thing or event, not even the 
happening of the correlation between being and thinking, i.e., 
the taking-place of meaningful presence—is necessary. As is 
shown especially by Heidegger’s “transcendentalization” of 
mortality, of the experience of the “possibility of its own 
impossibility” as the ultimate possibility of Dasein (Heidegger 
2001b, 260–267, 316–323; 2010, 249–255, 302–309), the 
absence of the correlation—and, thus, a reality without 
thinking—is absolutely conceivable. But if this is accepted, the 
correlationist framework bursts apart and strong 
correlationism is converted into what Meillassoux (2006a, 168; 
2008a, 121) terms a speculative materialism: an absolute 
certainty of the thinkability of being-without-thinking.15 
However, the thinking that can think this reality beyond 
meaningful presence can obviously no longer assume the form 
of a phenomenology or hermeneutics of sense and meaning. 
Following Badiou, Meillassoux (2006a, 37, 176–77; 2008a, 26, 
127–28) claims that it can operate only in terms of 
mathematics. Mathematics, and set theory in particular, is the 
formal method of thinking a reality independent of thinking. 
Meillassoux’s speculative philosophy is a genuine system 
in the sense that it professes to deduce all of its elements from 
its fundamental principle, namely, that of absolute contingency. 
Even the absolute bearing of mathematics is to be thus derived, 
although Meillassoux has thus far postponed this derivation to 
forthcoming works (2006a, 152–53; 2008a, 110–11). 
Meillassoux’s refutation of ontotheology is as such not directly 
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based on the acceptance of a mathematical ontology, but is an 
independent direct consequence of the principle of contingency. 
By absolutizing facticity, we obtain the thesis that  
it is absolutely necessary that every being [étant] might not exist. This 
is indeed a speculative thesis, since we are thinking an absolute, but it 
is not metaphysical, since we are not thinking any thing (any being) 
that would be absolute. The absolute is the absolute impossibility of a 
necessary being. (2006a, 82; 2008a, 60; tr. mod.) 
We see from this dissociation of speculative thinking (one 
that claims access to some form of absolute) and metaphysical 
thinking (one that claims access to some form of absolute being) 
that Meillassoux understands “metaphysics” in a strongly 
Heideggerian sense, one that coincides with “ontotheology,” i.e., 
with the positing of a “supreme being” as an absolute point of 
reference for all things. Meillassoux, too, thus subscribes to the 
diagnosis of the end of metaphysics. Like Badiou, however, he 
disagrees with the specific postmetaphysical prospects of 
Heideggerian hermeneutics. Meillassoux’s specific point of 
contention with Heidegger is the latter’s notion that renouncing 
ontotheological absolutes inevitably means renouncing all 
philosophical absolutes. After Finitude aims to show that “not 
all speculation is metaphysical, and not every absolute is 
dogmatic—it is possible to envisage an absolutizing 
[absolutoire] thought that would not be absolutist.” (2006a, 47; 
2008a, 34) What Meillassoux explicitly commits himself to is 
the critique of the “de-absolutizing implication”, according to 
which “if metaphysics is obsolete, so is the absolute.” (2006a, 
47; 2008a, 34) While his argument against total 
deabsolutization is that it is ultimately a self-defeating 
intellectual project that cannot avoid recourse to an absolute 
principle, his basic motivation for attacking it is, as with 
Badiou, related to the theological implications of Heideggerian 
post-ontotheology. While the hermeneutical deconstruction of 
ontotheology will undermine previously established forms of 
rational theology, Meillassoux maintains that this 
deconstruction has simultaneously opened the door to purely 
faith-based and “irrational” versions of religiosity Meillassoux 
designates as fideism. 
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[…] by destroying metaphysics […] one has inadvertently 
justified belief's claim to be the only means of access to the 
absolute. […] the de-absolutization of thought boils down to 
the mobilization of a fideist argument; but a fideism that is 
“fundamental”‘ rather than merely “historical”‘ in nature—
that is to say, a fideism that has become thought's defence of 
religiosity in general, rather than of a specific religion […]. 
The contemporary end of metaphysics is an end which, being 
sceptical, could only be a religious end of metaphysics. (2006a, 
63–64; 2008a, 45–46.) 
As the two most prominent representatives of a fideist 
“aspiration towards an absoluteness which would no longer 
retain anything metaphysical, and which one is generally 
careful to designate by another name,” Meillassoux (2006a, 66–
67; 2008a, 48) cites the evocation of the “mystical” in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as well as Heidegger’s idea of a 
“theology without ‘being’.” As Wittgenstein and Heidegger are 
for him also the central thinkers of strong correlationism 
(2006a, 56–57; 2008a, 41–42), he concludes that “fideism is 
merely the other name for strong correlationism.” This is one of 
the most problematic claims of Meillassoux’s After Finitude. 
One cannot help wondering what really justifies the use of the 
term “absolute” in connection with these two approaches which, 
as Meillassoux himself points out, precisely avoid presenting 
divinity as an “absolute” in the traditional sense of something 
radically self-sufficient and self-subsistent. Moreover, the 
applicability of the term “fideism” to the late Heidegger’s 
“theological” sketches, in which the postmetaphysical relation 
to the divinity or divinities is precisely not described in terms of 
faith, is highly questionable, as is Meillassoux’s interpretation 
according to which Heidegger planned a theology that should 
contain “nothing philosophical.” However, his general idea 
according to which conceiving God not as an entity but as a 
dimension of transcendence that resists objectification makes 
not only rational theology but also the rational atheology 
superfluous, seems more defensible. Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger indeed seem to render discussions concerning the 
existence and non-existence of the deity as well as its 
modalities (necessity, possibility, contingency) effectively 
meaningless. 
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It is important to see that while Meillassoux’s underlying 
philosophical project is essentially directed against the 
“theological turn” in post-Heideggerian phenomenology and 
hermeneutics, it is not the program of Badiou’s “contemporary 
atheism” that he is implementing, but something even more 
novel and unexpected, namely, the reintroduction of an 
explicitly philosophical notion of God as a being/entity, but one 
that is no longer the ontotheological necessary being but a 
merely possible and contingent one. Even though the definitive 
form of his relevant work remains unpublished, Meillassoux 
has already announced a forthcoming, completely reworked and 
extended version of his 1997 doctoral dissertation on “divine 
inexistence” (L’inexistence divine; 2006a, 67n1; 2008a, 132n15). 
On the basis of his dissertation (significant excerpts of its 
revised version have been published in an English translation 
in Graham Harman’s study on Meillassoux; Harman 2011, 175–
238), of an independently published article (Meillassoux 2006b; 
2008b), and of certain hints present in his recently published 
reading of Mallarmé (2011a; 2012), we already have an inkling 
of the direction in which Meillassoux is taking us.16 By all 
accounts, it seems he is developing a notion of a God-entity 
that, as a matter of fact, does not exist, but in which it is 
nevertheless rationally legitimate to place one’s faith since—in 
accordance with the principle of radical contingency—it can be, 
just as well as anything else. This divinity is not to be confused 
with the “God who may be” of Richard Kearney’s (2001; 2002) 
deeply Heideggerian account; the latter is articulated in terms 
of pure potentiality (dynamis) as a divinity whose presence will 
not assume the form of the actuality of a substance, but consists 
in a mere futural indication or reference. Meillassoux’s “God to 
come” is rather “possible” in the Deleuzian sense of virtuality, 
i.e., a possibility that is in no way foreshadowed or implied by 
what precedes it, but can only emerge ex nihilo, as an absolute 
novelty, compared by Meillassoux to the emergence of life from 
the world of matter and to the emergence of thought from the 
world of biological life (Harman 2011, 175–93).17 In a striking 
speculative retake of Kantian moral theology, Meillassoux 
emphasizes the ethical importance of a hope, without any 
supporting “evidence” but formally legitimized by speculative 
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materialism, of the emergence a radically novel divine entity 
that would redeem the traditional promises of the moral 
divinity—the enactment of a supreme good and of a supreme 
justice for the dead and the living—in a way that does not give 
rise to the immense traditional problem of theodicy, since the 
attributes of this entity no longer include absolute eternity and 
necessity (Meillassoux 2006b; 2008b; Harman 2011, 187–93, 
207–21). 
In conclusion, we may say that the contemporary 
philosophical overcoming of ontotheology, for which the divinity 
is an always already present (actual and substantial, absolute 
and necessary) entity, has left us with the fundamental figure 
of a non-present and purely futural god. The hermeneutical 
approach basically insisted on conceiving this god-to-come as a 
dimension of purely potential futurity, as an ultimate sense-
granting purpose whose sole form of presence is that of an 
indication, hint, or trace pointing to a fundamental absence. 
However, the recent speculative developments of contemporary 
materialism have, rather surprisingly, resuscitated a genuinely 
messianic notion of a divine “advent,” of the possible coming-
into-presence of the divine in a purely contingent and virtual, 
unmotivated and unpredictable, but nonetheless concrete and 
intratemporal, event, which nevertheless can bestow a purpose 
and dimension to the present situation in the form of an 
unfounded but rationally legitimate hope. It is to be expected 
that Meillassoux’s forthcoming works and their philosophical 
reception will determine whether the “strong correlationist” 
phase in philosophical approaches to theology is truly giving 
way to a new, non-ontotheological rationalism. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
                                                 
1 In his Zürich seminar, Heidegger (2005, 436–37) replies to a question 
concerning the identity of being and God: “Being [Sein] and god are not 
identical, and I would never attempt to think the essence [Wesen] of god 
through being. […] Were I yet to write a theology, as I am sometimes tempted 
to do, the word ‘being’ should not occur in it. […] I believe that being can 
never be thought as the ground and essence of god, but that the experience of 
god and its manifestness (insofar as it is encountered by the human being) 
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nonetheless takes place [sich ereignet] in the direction of being, which never 
means that being could be a possible predicate of god.” That Heidegger makes 
this statement in 1951 implies that he does not yet qualify the draft on the 
„ultimate god” in Contributions to Philosophy as a ‘theology’ in the strict 
sense. 
2 Among the most elaborate and thorough discussions of Heidegger’s notion of 
ontotheology are Thomson 2005 and 2010. 
3 See, e.g., Heidegger 1983, 65–67; 1988a, 29; 1990, 17; 1992b, 14; 1993a, 206, 
286, 307; 1995a, 42–44; 1997a, 37–38; 2006a, 60–61; 2008a, 168, 215, 227. 
4 On this reading of Descartes, see, e.g., Heidegger 1989, 212–13; 1996, 429–
30; 1998b, 112–71, 391–97, 410–13; 1998d, 325; 1999, 148–49; 2000b, 69–72, 
82–83; 2002c, 66, 74–76, 81–84; 2003a, 87–88, 98–99; 2003b, 87, 98–100, 106–
11; 2012, 166–67. 
5 On the unity of transcendental apperception in Kant, see Heidegger 1988a, 
125–29, 142–47; 1996, 458–63; 1997a, 177–182, 201–209; 1997c, 55–59; 
1998a, 78–84; 1998c, 419–420; 1998d, 347–50; 2003a, 57–58. 
6 On this reading of Nietzsche, see, e.g., Heidegger 1991a, 3–6; 1991b, 198–
208; 1991c, 3–9, 150–251; 1991d, 147–96; 1998b, 1–4, 415–32, 585–94; 1998c, 
1–22, 177–229, 231–361; 2000b, 77–86, 97–122; 2002c, 157–99; 2003a, 93–
102; 2003b, 209–67. 
7 On the “other onset,” see, e.g., Heidegger 1989, 4–6, 55, 57–60, 167–224; 
1992a, 124–25, 184–90; 1994a, 108–09, 158–66; 1999, 3–5, 38, 40–42, 117–57; 
2012, 6–8, 44, 46–48, 133–77. 
8 For one of the most illuminating discussions of the Heideggerian “ultimate 
god,” see Greisch 2000; 2008. 
9 I adopt here the rendering of Seyn as “beyng,” employed in the more recent 
Rojcewicz-Vallega-Neu translation of Contributions (instead of ‘be-ing’ in the 
Emad-Maly translation). The Early Modern English orthography “beyng” has 
the advantage of being functionally similar, as an archaic and obsolete 
spelling of “being,” to the German Seyn (still in use in the early 19th century). 
10 In Verse VIII of The Rhine, Hölderlin (1951, 152) writes: “[…] if there is 
anything / that the celestial ones require [bedürfen], / it is heroes and humans 
/ and other mortals. For since / the most blissful ones [Seligsten] feel nothing 
by themselves, / there must […] be another who partakes / in the names of the 
gods and feels. / That is the one they need [brauchen] [...].” Heidegger (1980, 
269) comments: “With this Verse VIII the poet’s thinking ascends one of the 
most protruding and solitary peaks of Western thinking, and that is to say, at 
the same time: of beyng [Seyns].” 
11 In his Logics of Worlds (2006), Badiou provocatively maintains that “[t]he 
critical machinery he [Kant] set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy […]. 
Kant is the inventor of the disastrous theme of our ‘finitude’ […].” (Badiou 
2006b, 561; 2009, 535) 
12 This is the sense in which infinity is attributed to God by Thomas Aquinas 
(Summa theologiae Ia q7 a1). 
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13 Beistegui (2005, 45) aptly summarizes Badiou’s philosophical project as an 
attempt to free thought from the double horizon of unicity (ontology) and 
transcendence (theology). 
14 On the ambiguities inherent in Badiou’s relationship to theology, see 
Clemens and Roffe 2008; Depoortere 2009; Phelps 2013. One of the only 
studies that also discusses Meillassoux’s relationship to theology is Watkin 
2011. 
15 On Meillassoux’s “argument from mortality,” see my article 
“Transcendental Idealism and Strong Correlationism: Meillassoux and the 
End of Heideggerian Finitude,” forthcoming in Phenomenology and the 
Transcendental, edited by Sara Heinämaa, Mirja Hartimo, and Timo 
Miettinen (London: Routledge). 
16 For some of the few existing commentaries on Meillassoux’s notion of the 
divine, see Harman 2011, 90–122; Johnston 2011; Watkin 2011, 132–67. 
17 On the distinction between potentiality and virtuality, see Meillassoux 
2006c; 2011b.  
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